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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
majority of the Court in looking at the context of the contract and fact situatiorn
found enough to convince themselves that a triable issue was present. In the
context of the contract they interpreted the words of the non-assignment clause
"shall have the right to withhold" and "shall not be required" to indicate that
Twentieth Century had the option to either accept or reject assignments, depending on its own actions. The certain facts that indicate that waiver might be present
were that Twentieth Century had examined all the contracts prior to accepting
the picture and as a result knew of the assignment but still did not exercise its
option to hold National in default within the sixty days allowed by the contract.
Also, Twentieth Century's attorney was notified of the assignments by the assignees
and he in no way indicated that they would not be carried out. The majority did
not believe these facts were conclusive but that they did present a triable issue
which precluded granting summary judgment since such relief is predicated upon
the clear absence of such an issue.3 1
The dissent took issue with the majority only in respect to the waiver presenting a triable issue in the above fact situation. A waiver is characterized by
an intentional relinquishment of a known right3 2 and the dissenters did not feel
that the evidence presented indicated such a release. They pointed out that neither
the actions of the defendant's attorney nor the acceptance of the picture with
knowledge of the assignments, necessarily indicated a waiver of the nonassignment clause. The defendant's intent in incorporating this clause in the contract
was clearly to avoid disputes among the assignees. Since a waiver would be directly
contrary to such intent, the dissent reasoned that there should be a stronger
evidence upon which to base a finding of waiver.
It is submitted that, although the dissents position that no single act of the
defendant would constitute a waiver might well be valid, the cumulative effect
of the defendant's actions presented a triable issue and thus the granting of a
motion for summary judgment was improper.
Application Of Fire Insurance Proceeds To Purchase Price
If a vendee is in possession of certain realty under a contract of sale, and
part of the premises is destroyed due to no fault of the vendor, the vendee, absent
any agreement to the contrary, must still perform the contract and pay the full
purchase price. 33 An exception to this general rule is found in the recent case
3
of Raplee v.Piper.

4

Here, the vendee was in possession under a contract of sale and a fire caused
31.
32.
33.
34.

DiMenna & Sons v. City of New York, 301 N.Y. 118, 92 N.E.2d 918 (1950).
Werking v. Amity Estates, 2 N.Y.2d 43, 155 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAw §240 (a).
3 N.Y.2d 179, 164 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1957).
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substantial damage to the subject matter of the contract. As a term of the
contract, the vendee paid for the premium on the insurance, before the title was
to pass to him. After the vendor had received indemnity from the insurance
company for this loss, the vendee sought to apply the insurance proceeds to the
purchase price remaining unpaid.
The court previously in Brownell v. Board of Education33 decided that a
contract of insurance is personal and does not run with the land. This decision
followed an English decision"0 since superceded by statute in that country. 37
The inequities that arose from the holding in Brownell were forseen by the New
York Law Revision Commission,38 but the legislature did not enact the statute
proposed to remedy the situation.
The majority here distinguished the Brownell case from the present situation
by the showing that in that situation it was the vendor who paid for the insurance
and as such the insurance was not part of the res bargained for. No inequity
arose from that decision as the contract called for delivery of the property in as
good a condition as it was in at the time of the contract, and the vendee could
deduct the damages from the purchase price. The Court felt that regardless
of the legal theory they might adopt, a trust fund rationale30 or other theory, in this
situation the insurance has been taken out for the benefit of both vendor and
vendee. The vendee should not have to pay for the insurance premiums and then
have to pay the full purchase price for damaged property. Such an inequitable
situation should not be allowed to exist, despite the dissent's excellent technical
arguments and the legislative failure to amend the law to eliminate this injustice.
The flexibility of the courts has eliminated the inequitable result that would occur
had the dissenters prevailed.
Confract -

Measure Of Damages

In Bellizzi v. Huntley Estates40 a construction contract called for a house
with an attached garage substantially at street level. The completed driveway had
a steep grade precluding its safe and convenient use.
The general rule in building contracts is that where the defect is one that
can be cured without undue expense the owner recovers that amount reasonably
required to remedy the defect. 4" If the defect is not so remediable, the damages
35. 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1936).
36. Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
37. 15 GEO. V, ch. 20 §47 (1925).
38. 1936 REPORT OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION CoMMISsIoN, 767.
39. See, Persico v. Guernsey, 129 Misc. 190, 220 N.Y. Supp. (Sup. Ct. 1927),
aff'd 222 App. Div. 719, 225 N.Y. Supp. 890 (4th Dep't 1927).
40. 3 N.Y.2d 112, 164 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1957).
41. McKegney v. Illinois Surety Co., 180 App. Div. 507, 167 N.Y. Supp. 843
Ust Dep't 1917); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1363, p. 3825 (rev. ed. 1937).

